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Abstract 
Envisioning an international public order means envisioning an order sustained by a legal 
and institutional framework that ensures effective collective action with a view to defending 
fundamental values of the international community and to solving common global problems, 
in line with the universalist vision of international law. Envisioning the construction of an 
international public order means considering that this framework, which embraces and 
promotes the respect for human rights focused particularly on human dignity, is 
consolidating and evolving based on the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 
establishment of the ICC added an international punitive perennial facet to international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law and linked justice to peace, to security 
and to the well-being of the world, reaffirming the principles and objectives of the Charter of 
the United Nations (UN). Nevertheless, the affirmation process of an international criminal 
justice by punishing those responsible for the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole, faces numerous obstacles of political and normative 
character. This article identifies the central merits of the Rome Statute and ICC’s practice 
and indicates its limitations caused by underlying legal-political tensions and interpretive 
questions relating to the crime of aggression and crimes against humanity. Finally, the 
article argues for the indispensability of rethinking the jurisdiction of the ICC, defending the 
categorization of terrorism as an international crime, and of articulating its mission with the 
"responsibility to protect", which may contribute to the consolidation of the ICC and of 
international criminal law and reinforce its role in the construction of an effective 
international public order. 
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The ICC will not be a panacea for all the ills of humankind. It will not eliminate conflicts, nor 
return victims to life, nor restore survivors to their prior conditions of well-being and it will not 
bring all perpetrators of major crimes to justice. But it can help avoid some conflicts, prevent 
some victimisation and bring to justice some of the perpetrators of these crimes. In doing so, the 
ICC will strengthen world 
 order and contribute to world peace and security. 
 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ceremony for the Opening for Signature of the Convention  
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 18 July 1998 
 
… justice is a fundamental building block of sustainable peace 
 
Kampala Declaration, 11 June 2010. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Envisioning an international public order means envisioning an order sustained by a 
legal and institutional framework that ensures effective collective action with a view to 
defending fundamental values of the international community and to solving common 
global problems, in line with the universalist vision of international law. Such an 
international order implies institutions, procedures and international instruments that 
enable the achievement of common objectives (Bogdandy; Delavalle, 2008: 1-2). 
Envisioning the construction of an international public order means considering that this 
framework which embraces and promotes the respect for human rights focused 
particularly on human dignity, aiming to safeguard peace, security and well-being of 
the world, is consolidating and evolving based on a permanent and independent court, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The preludes of an international criminal court as a protector and as a driving force of a 
public order date back to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 1948 under the auspices of the United Nations (UN)1
                                                        
1  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Official Gazette, 1st Series A, 
No. 160, 07.14.1998. 
. Indeed, the 
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General Assembly, taking into account the question raised during the discussion on the 
punishment of crimes of genocide and the increasing need for a competent body for the 
trial of certain crimes under international law in a developing international community 
invited the International Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility of its 
establishment2. The positive response of the Commission3 resulted in a draft statute, 
elaborated over several decades and submitted to the General Assembly in 1994 that 
advocated the importance of the creation of an international criminal court4
Armin von Bogdandy and Sergio Dellavalle stress that the progress of an international 
public order and effective international law largely depends on the fate of international 
criminal law and on the success of the Statute’s regulatory project (2008: 2). However, 
how is this dependence manifested? How could the regulatory project and, more 
specifically, the ICC be more successful and influence this construction in a more 
effective manner? 
. In this 
sense, the Assembly established a preparatory committee in 1996 with the aim of 
producing a draft text, which served as the basis for negotiations at the Rome 
Conference in 1998, culminating in the signature of the Statute. 
This article examines the merits of the Rome Statute and ICC’s practice and then 
explicates its limitations. Lastly, it argues for the indispensability of a process of 
acquiring new dimensions and of deepening existing facets, formulating some 
proposals. 
 
2.  The Rome Statute and the recent praxis of the ICC: key 
considerations 
The Rome Statute of 1998 reaffirmed the relevance of the UN Charter objectives and 
principles5
The Statute established the notion of "most serious crimes" of concern to the 
international community as whole and which are enumerated in Article 5: crime of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. In this 
context, the statute added a punitive facet to international human rights law and to 
international humanitarian law, since until then the punishment of its violation 
depended solely on national criminal jurisdictions.  
 and recognized the existence of common values such as peace, security and 
well-being of the world which should be safeguarded by the court. 
                                                        
2  U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/260 B (III), Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an 
International Criminal Court, 09.12.1948. 
3  U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/34, Report of the International Law Commission on its Second Session, 5 June to 29 
July 1950, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth session, Supplement No.12 (A/1316), Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, vol. II, 1950, §140, p. 379. Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur 
pointed out in his report submitted to the Commission that “The community of States is entitled to 
prevent crimes against the peace and security of mankind and crimes against the dictates of the human 
conscience, including therein the hideous crime of genocide. If the rule of law is to govern the community 
of States and protect it against violations of the international public order, it can only be satisfactorily 
established by the promulgation of an international penal code and by the permanent functioning of an 
international criminal jurisdiction”, UN. Doc. A/CN.4/15 and Corr.1, Report on the Question of 
International Criminal Jurisdiction, Question of international criminal jurisdiction, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, vol. II, 1950, §136, p. 17. 
4  U.N. Doc. A/49/10, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-22 July 1994, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Forty-ninth session, Supplement No.10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, 
vol. II(2), pp. 26 ff. 
5  See Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter. 
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Specifically, regarding International Human Rights Law, the Statute incorporated, in 
Article 6, the definition of the crime of genocide as stated in Article II of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Hence, genocide means 
any act committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group: homicide, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members, 
deliberately inflicting conditions of life designed to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births, and the forced 
transfer of children to another group. 
The punitive facet of international humanitarian law was embodied in Article 8 related 
to the war crimes prescribed in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Court has 
jurisdiction over these crimes “when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of 
a large-scale commission of such crimes”. This article covers grave breaches of these 
conventions, i.e., acts against persons or property and serious violations of the laws 
and customs applicable in international armed conflict under international law. In the 
case of non-international armed conflicts, war crimes refer to violations contained in 
Article 3, common to the Geneva Conventions. That is, acts committed against 
individuals taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms or were placed hors of combat: acts of violence to life 
and person, outrages upon personal dignity, hostage-taking, the passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions, without previous trial by a regularly constituted 
court, which affords all indispensable judicial guarantees as well as other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable to such conflicts under the international 
law framework. 
Under the Statute, crimes against humanity are any act committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population with knowledge of the 
attack, such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of 
population, imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, 
rape, sexual slavery, persecution against an identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender grounds or on other 
universally accepted criteria, crimes against humanity, forced disappearance of 
persons, the crime of apartheid, and other inhumane acts of a similar nature 
intentionally causing considerable suffering, serious injury or affect mental or physical 
health (Article 7). 
In contrast to the crimes of genocide and war crimes, the crimes against humanity are 
not codified in an international convention and the analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
international ad hoc criminal tribunals reveals different understandings. The 
systematization contained in the Statute encompasses acts that had not been specified 
previously as crimes against humanity, being therefore the most comprehensive listing 
on this matter. 
The merits of the Statute are not solely limited to codifying the most serious crimes, 
except the crime of aggression whose definition and conditions for the exercise of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction were procrastinated to a review Conference (Article 5, paragraph 2). 
By prescribing the application of the general principles of criminal law (Part III), the 
principles of the presumption of innocence (Article 66) and of the prohibition of double 
jeopardy - ne bis in idem (Article 20) by the Court, the Statute contributes significantly 
to the consolidation and development of international criminal law (Stein; von Buttlar 
2012: 438). 
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This punitive system is based on the complementarity principle (Article 1), that even 
though constraining the ICC’s power, enables the Court to exercise influence over the 
states’ sphere of authority. It forms part of a gradual erosion process of the 
Westphalian view of the sacrosanctity of state sovereignty and internal affairs. As 
Miguel de Serpa Soares argues: 
 
"any form of international justice always represents a means of 
limiting national sovereignty. In the case of International Criminal 
Law this limitation is even more evident by compromising 
elements essential to the classic paradigm of International Law, as 
for example the punitive monopoly of States or the concept of a 
quasi-absolute State sovereignty" (Soares, 2014: 9). 
 
In effect, the Court is competent to determine a state’s unwillingness to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution: situations where the proceedings were or are being 
undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility within the Court’s jurisdiction, existence of an 
unjustified delay in the proceedings or the proceedings were or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially, and they are or were being carried out in a manner that is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice (Article 17, 
paragraph 2). 
In addition, the Statute imposes upon the States Parties the obligation to cooperate 
with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction 
(Article 86) and to adopt procedures under national law for all of the forms of 
international cooperation and judicial assistance specified under Part IX (Article 88). 
The praxis evidences an increasing activity of the Court, demonstrating its commitment 
to ending impunity. 
In 2012, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was sentenced to 14 years in prison for war crimes.  
He was found guilty of enlisting and conscripting of children under 15 years of age to 
actively participate in a non-international armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo from 1 September 2002 to 13 August 20036. In 2014, Germain Katanga was 
found guilty and sentenced to 12 years in prison for one count of crime against 
humanity (murder) and four counts of war crimes (murder, attacking a civilian 
population, destruction of property and pillaging) committed on 24 February 2003 
during the attack on the village of Bogoro in the Democratic Republic of the Congo7
Presently, the Office of the Prosecutor is investigating several situations by state party 
referral − Uganda (2004), Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), Mali (2012), The 
Union of the Comoros (2013) and Central African Republic (2005 and 2014) − by 
proprio motu action of the Prosecutor: Kenya (request submitted in 2009, authorization 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber in 2010), Ivory Coast (request submitted and authorization of 
. 
                                                        
6  See ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 
Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, 10.07.2012. 
7  See ICC-01/04-01/07-3484, the Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on the sentence (Article 76 of the Statute), 23.05.2014. 
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the Pre-Trial Chamber in 2011) − and conducting preliminary examinations concerning 
several states, namely Ukraine, a non-state party which accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Court (2014). Even more important is the referral of the situations in the Darfur region, 
in Sudan (2005) and in Libya (2011) by the UN Security Council due to the existence of 
evidence of international crimes8
 
. It can be considered that these referrals are in line 
with the argument of universalism that this competence of the Council allows the 
extension of the Court’s jurisdiction to non-States Parties and thus constitutes an 
"evolution in shaping the international order" (Kowalski, 2011: 124). 
3. Limitations of the ICC and implications for the applicability of 
International Criminal Law 
The limitations of the ICC result, firstly, from legal and political tensions arising from its 
relationship with the Security Council and the complementary character of its 
jurisdiction and, secondly, from the ambiguity of certain formulations contained in the 
provisions concerning the “crime of aggression” and “crimes against humanity”, raising 
interpretive problems which the law applicable by the Court under Article 21 of the 
Statute9
 
 does not clarify categorically. 
3.1. Legal-political tensions and the problem of decision 
implementation 
Article 13, paragraph b) of the Statute provides for the possibility of the Security 
Council to refer a situation to the Prosecutor under Chapter VII. This means that the 
consent from the state in which the acts were committed or of the nationality of the 
person alleged to have committed international crimes is not required. The Security 
Council’s referrals of the situations in Darfur, Sudan, in 2005 and in Libya in 2011 were 
considered historic. However, in the first case, the Security Council has not actively 
supported the ICC with respect to detention and to the states’ duty to cooperate with 
the Court. In the second case, despite the swift reaction of the Council, the resolution, 
as the Darfur referral decision, was flawed, as it, for instance, excluded the Court’s 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties (Stahn 2012: 328). 
But it is mainly Article 16, according to which an investigation or a prosecution may not 
be initiated or proceeded with for a period of 12 months if the Council has requested 
the Court to that effect in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII, with the possibility 
                                                        
8 Resolution 1593 (2005) which refers the situation in Darfur (since July 1, 2002) to the ICC does not 
specify possible international crimes committed in the region. However, the Security Council took note of 
the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur – this Commission was established by 
former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, on the basis of resolution 1564 (2004) with a mandate to 
investigate reports of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in 
the region - which considered that the crimes committed may amount to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity (UN Doc. S/2005/60). Resolution 1970 (2011) which refers the situation in Libya to the Court 
mentions that the widespread and systematic attacks taking place against the Libyan civilian population 
could constitute crimes against humanity. 
9  According to Article 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, the Court must in the first place, apply the Statute, the 
Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and in the second place, where appropriate, 
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law including the established principles of 
the international law of armed conflict. Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from 
different national legal systems and principles and rules of law as interpreted by the Court in previous 
decisions. 
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of renewal, that raises sharper criticism based on the argument that this action 
undermines the independence of the Court10
 
. Jorge Bacelar Gouveia qualifies this 
mechanism as "whimsy" and underlines that: 
“It is very difficult to accept the interference of a political organ in 
the heart of the exercise of public power of a body that should be 
jurisdictional, whose intervention, above all, can not only happen 
at any time in the proceedings, but also repeat itself, though it has 
in its favor the temporality and the astringent context of Chapter 
VII of the UNC” (2013: 792-793). 
 
The Court's complementary nature to national criminal jurisdictions means that, as 
Judge Philippe Kirsch noted, the Statute is a two-pillar system: a judicial pillar 
represented by the Court and an enforcement pillar represented by the States11
In fact, the execution process of the warrants of arrest has been to a certain extent 
troubled. Therefore, it cannot be considered a coincidence that the first words of the 
declaration of the first Review Conference of the Statute - the Declaration of Kampala 
of 2010 – focus on a renewed spirit of cooperation and solidarity, emphasizing the 
States Parties’ commitment to fight impunity and ensure lasting respect for the 
enforcement of international criminal justice. 
. Yet, 
the absence of a permanent mechanism that ensures compliance with the court’s 
decisions hampers the implementation of this pillar and, therefore, the fight against 
impunity. 
The case of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is representative of this problem. The 
origins of this case date back to 2005 when the Security Council referred the Darfur 
situation to the Court in resolution 1593. The former ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, initiated an investigation later that year and in 2008 requested the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to issue a warrant of arrest against the Sudanese President (first warrant 
issued on 4th March 2009 and the second warrant issued 12th July 2010, accused of 
indirect responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide)12
                                                        
10  The definition of the crime of aggression involved the establishment of procedures that emphasize this 
dependence in the case of a state party referral or proprio motu action by the Prosecutor, although 
paragraph 9 of Article 15 bis underlines that such determination by an external body is not binding on the 
Court. According to paragraphs 6 and 8 of this Article respectively, when the Prosecutor concludes that 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation, he/she must first ascertain whether the 
Security Council made a determination of such an act committed by the State concerned and notify the 
United Nations Secretary-General of the situation before the Court; if no determination is made within six 
months after the date of notification, the Prosecutor may continue the investigation as long as the Pre-
Trial Chamber has authorized the initiation of the investigation and the Security Council has not decided 
otherwise under Article 16. 
. This 
was the first case in which an arrest warrant was issued against a head of state in 
office. Subsequently, the African Union (AU) submitted a request, pursuant to Article 16 
of the Statute, to the Council to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII to defer the 
decision, which was declined by the Security Council. As a result, the AU appealed 
repeatedly to Member States not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest of Omar al-
11  ICC, Philippe Kirsch, Opening remarks at the fifth session of the Assembly of State Parties, 23.11.2006. 
12  ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Omar al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, 04.03.2009 and ICC-02/05-01/09-95, Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. 
Omar al-Bashir, Second arrest warrant for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir,12.07.2010. 
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Bashir13
On several occasions, the ICC urged, unsuccessfully, the States Parties and non-States 
Parties to execute the arrest warrants issued against al-Bashir during his presence on 
their territory. In April 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo failed to comply with its obligations to arrest and surrender Omar 
al-Bashir during his visit to the country. Consequently, in accordance with Article 87, 
paragraph 7, the Pre-Trial Chamber informed the Assembly of State Parties and the 
Security Council
. As David Luban stated, the Court’s weakness, namely, the gap between the 
aspiration for criminal justice and its accomplishment, became evident when most 
African and Arab states gathered to support the Sudanese President against the ICC’s 
decision (2013: 508). 
14
Another relevant case regards the current President of Kenya, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 
accused of being criminally responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for crimes against 
humanity. This case concerns the violence that occurred in Kenya following the 2007 
presidential elections that caused numerous victims. In 2009, Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
submitted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization of an investigation, 
which culminated, at request of the Prosecutor, with the issuance of an arrest warrant 
against six Kenyan officials, the so-called "Ocampo six”, by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
2011. That year, the AU endorsed the Kenyan government’s request to the Security 
Council to adopt a resolution, requesting the ICC to defer the proceedings against the 
Kenyan president and the vice president, William Ruto, pursuant to Article 16. The AU 
renewed the request in 2013, which was once again declined by the Security Council
. The fact that the latter may take the necessary measures on this 
matter demonstrates that the power to enforce the decisions of the Court lies also on 
this organ. 
15
In June 2014, the AU adopted an amendment to the protocol of the Statute of the 
future African Court of Justice and Human Rights, with jurisdiction over international 
crimes, that grants immunity from prosecution to heads of state and senior 
government officials, in opposition to Article 27
. 
16
                                                        
13  See Theresa Reinold (2012), Constitutionalization? Whose constitutionalization? Africa’s ambivalent 
engagement with the International Criminal Court, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 10(4): 
1076-1105, Ken Obura (2011), The Security Council’s Power to Defer ICC Cases under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute, Journal of African and International Law, 4(3) 581-583 and Stella Nyana (2011), The ICC 
at a Crossroads: Between Prosecution and Peace in Africa, Journal of African and International Law, 4(1): 
1-74. 
 of the Rome Statute, which allows for 
the prospect of the persistence of legal and political tensions between the AU and the 
ICC.  
14  ICC-02/05-01/09-195, Pre-Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Omar al-Bashir, Decision on the 
Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to 
the Court, 09.04.2014. 
15  See Theresa Reinold (2012), Constitutionalization? Whose constitutionalization? Africa’s ambivalent 
engagement with the International Criminal Court, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 10(4): 
1076-1105, Ken Obura (2011), The Security Council’s Power to Defer ICC Cases under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute, Journal of African and International Law, 4(3) 581-583 and Stella Nyana (2011), The ICC 
at a Crossroads: Between Prosecution and Peace in Africa, Journal of African and International Law, 4(1): 
1-74. 
16  Article 27, paragraph 1 determines that "this Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a 
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no 
case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence”. Article 27, paragraph 2 states that "immunities or special 
procedural rules may attach to the official capacity of a person under national or international law, shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person". 
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3.2. Weaknesses in the interpretation of the Rome Statute 
 
3.2.1. "Crime of Aggression" and "Act of Aggression" 
The failure to reach an agreement on a definition of "crime of aggression" and 
respective elements at the Rome Conference resulted in the inclusion in the Statute of 
an additional clause to the incorporation of this crime as a “core crime”. This clause 
provided for the exercise of jurisdiction once a provision was adopted in a Review 
Conference, in accordance with Articles 121 and 123, defining this crime and setting 
out the conditions for that purpose (Article 5, paragraph 2). In this sense, resolution F 
in Annex I of the Final Act of the Rome Conference established a preparatory 
commission with various tasks including the preparation of proposals for a provision on 
this crime17
The definition of the crime of aggression adopted at the Kampala Conference 
represents a significant development in international criminal law
; this task was subsequently attributed to the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression. 
18
Regarding the formal constraints, the Court will only have jurisdiction over crimes 
committed one year after acceptance or ratification by a minimum of thirty states
. It is undeniable 
that the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression will constitute an 
evolution, since it will be the first time that a permanent criminal justice system 
imposes criminal liability for the illegal use of force. However, it is subjected to formal 
and material constraints, the latter giving rise to interpretive issues that may hinder 
the determination of the existence of such a crime. 
19
As for the material constraints, the new Article 8 bis, paragraph 1, defines the crime of 
aggression as: 
 and 
after a decision to be taken only after 1 January 2017 in the Assembly of States Parties 
to activate the Court’s jurisdiction (Articles 15 bis and 15 ter, paragraphs 2 and 3). 
These limitations garner criticism by some authors as Mary Ellen O'Connell and 
Mirakmal Niyazmatov, who qualify this process as “byzantine” (2012: 191). 
 
"Planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations". 
 
                                                        
17  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I), United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, Rome 15 June-17 July 1998, United 
Nations, 2002, §7, pp. 72 and f. 
18  See, among others, Niels Blokker; Claus Kress (2010), A Consensus Agreement on the Crime of 
Aggression: Impressions from Kampala, Leiden Journal of International Law, 23(4): 889-895.  
19  Currently, 15 states accepted the amendments concerning the crime of aggression: Andorra, Austria, 
Belgium, Botswana, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Samoa, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
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Criminal liability is solely applicable to individuals in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct a state’s political or military action. In other words, the 
leadership position is a determining factor. 
Paragraph 2 refines the notion of "act of aggression". It means the use of armed force 
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of 
another State or in other manner inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter. 
This provision absorbed Article 1 of the Definition of Aggression of the UN General 
Assembly - resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974. Simultaneously, it listed several acts that 
may qualify as an act of aggression, as mentioned in Article 3 of the Definition of 
Aggression, such as invasion, military occupation and bombardment by the armed 
forces of a State against another State’s territory. It is also important to note that the 
act of aggression must be considered in the context of its “character”, “scale”, and 
“gravity”. This means that a determination of the existence of a crime of aggression 
presupposes an act of aggression constituting a manifest violation of the Charter. Thus, 
although the act of aggression can only be perpetrated by a State, the responsibility for 
such unlawful acts lies on the individual who is responsible for the state’s action. 
Articles 15 bis and 15 ter establish the procedures under which the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction. The first article concerns the possibility to open an investigation pursuant 
to a state referral or a proprio motu action by the Prosecutor. Article 15 ter prescribes 
the possibility of a Security Council referral, which means that in this case the Court 
will also be competent for the investigation and prosecution of crimes of aggression 
regardless of the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction by the concerned States. 
The Kampala Conference defined the crime of aggression and its elements which serve 
the purpose of clarifying and assisting the Court in the interpretation and application of 
the amendments to the Statute. However, the enunciated provisions and clarifications 
contain some ambiguities. 
As far as "act of aggression" is concerned, while the criteria of "gravity" and "scale" 
were included to avoid overloading the Court with minor cases, the criterion of 
"character"  aimed to exclude controversial cases involving the use of force (Mancini, 
2012: 236). However, the criteria of "character," "gravity" and "scale" used to assess 
whether an act constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter lack definition. The latter 
two undefined criteria are also used in the determination of an armed attack in Article 
51 of the UN Charter and this lack of clarity could be problematic, particularly given the 
existing divergences regarding the lawful use of force in self-defence or in the case of 
humanitarian intervention (Santos, 2012). The elements of crimes refer that the 
determination of a "manifest" violation of the Charter is objective, but this process 
within the UN is not peaceful. 
At the same time, the remission of paragraph 2 of Article 8 to resolution 3314 of the 
General Assembly with the purpose of clarifying the term “act of aggression” raises 
some questions. Firstly, some formulations in the resolution are vague and the 
enunciated list is not exhaustive, which may lead to controversial situations. Secondly, 
the article does not provide clarification whether and to what extent other articles of 
the resolution were applicable or relevant to the Court (Surendran Koran: 252). 
In addition to the political character of the Definition of Aggression − the General 
Assembly can only make recommendations, devoid of any binding effect −, paragraphs 
6, 7 and 8 of Article 15 bis confirm the power of the Security Council. In fact, Article 39 
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of the Charter stipulates the exclusive power of the Council to determine the existence 
of an act of aggression and it may refer to cases which are not mentioned in the 
Definition of Aggression. The practice, however, is not uniform, and, repeatedly, in its 
Chapter VII decisions the Security Council uses different wording. 
Other aspects have been criticized such as the complete exclusion of acts committed by 
nationals of non-states parties – unlike the procedures relating to the "most serious 
crimes" − and the “retrograde opt-out clause” (Alam, 2010: 179-180) that provides for 
the possibility of voluntary exclusion from the Court's jurisdiction (Article 15 bis, 
paragraph 4). Other critics consider the resolution as a political guidance in 
determinations of state responsibility and, therefore, it did not contemplate its 
application to individual liability (Alam, 2010: 170). 
But, an essential criticism can be pointed to the fact that the definition of aggression 
adopted in Kampala did not contemplate a possible aggression by non-state actors. The 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated the likelihood of such an act 
being committed by non-state actors as well as the magnitude, comparable to an action 
perpetrated by a State. 
In fact, this solution reveals problems that cannot be underestimated otherwise it could 
hamper the proper functioning of the ICC. However, the pessimistic view of some more 
critical authors like Mary Ellen O'Connell and Mirakmal Niyazmatov who argue that “the 
substantive provision leaves experts unclear to what the prosecutable crime even is” 
cannot be corroborated. These authors doubt the feasibility of criminal proceedings and 
regret that the solution presented is different from the definition of crime of aggression 
under international law, affirming that this prohibition of aggression must not be 
undermined by the political compromise reached at Kampala (O'Connell; Niyazmatov 
2012: 191, 207). 
 
3.2.2.  "Crimes against Humanity" 
Some formulations of Article 7 reveal a certain ambiguity. Several authors highlight 
interpretive difficulties and their consequences.  
Jordan J. Paust considers the formulations too restrictive and unclear: “Article 7 
contains a limiting definition of 'attack' that is lacking in common sense. Instead of 
recognizing that one attack can constitute an 'attack', Article 7 (2)(a) requires that an 
'attack' involves ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts’” (2010: 
691). The author also argues that the use of the word “attack” instead of, for example, 
act(s) committed (against) is problematic, since this may result in the impossibility to 
include certain situations linked to crimes of this type and that are included in the 
listing. Moreover, according to the author, the phrases "course of conduct" and 
"multiple commission of acts" are debatable, since they do not include acts of torture, 
rape, persecution among others (ibid.: 692-693). 
Further criticism can be pointed to the expression “when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack”, since it leaves open the following question: Which is the 
threshold of “widespread or systematic”? 
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Another interpretive problem relates to the understanding of the formulation “other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental and physical health” (paragraph 1, subparagraph k). This 
interpretation became relevant for the first time in the joint indictment of Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui in 2008. The Office of the Prosecutor accused both 
of perpetrating such acts and in its decision confirming the charges, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber decided that the wording should be interpreted strictly. However, several 
authors like Bernhard Kuschnik support a broad interpretation (2010: 524-530). 
According to Cameron Russell, one of the interpretive problems relates to the notion of 
“civilian”. The author advocates that the parameters are not clear, which is partly a 
result of the decoupling of these crimes from the requirement of the existence of an 
armed conflict. This concept was employed to differentiate civilians from "combatants", 
but the fact that these crimes can be committed in times of peace generates 
interpretive problems (2011: 60-61). In addition, an “attack directed against any 
civilian population” implies a conduct “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack” (Paragraph 2, subparagraph a), since the 
term "organizational" is imprecise, which also results from the dissociation with the 
existence of an armed conflict. Thus, it becomes necessary to define "organization" to 
distinguish it from the entity of the state (Ibid.: 63). In the author's opinion, the 
requirement of "policy" seems to create some inconsistency within the Statute (ibid.: 
70). Leila Nadya Sadat notes that the Pre-Trial Chambers have been demonstrating 
different positions on the interpretation of Article 7, especially, regarding the phrase 
“State or organizational policy” (2013: 335). This element for the prosecution for these 
crimes remains controversial (ibid.: 352) and should be interpreted broadly otherwise it 
could result in the fragmentation of international criminal law (ibid.: 375). The 
dissenting opinion of Hans-Peter Kaul, following the request of the Prosecutor to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation into the post-election violence in Kenya, 
showed an opposite understanding. According to the judge, only states or organizations 
with similar characteristics to a State following criminal policies may perpetrate crimes 
against humanity. This position has gathered support in the doctrine and within the 
Court (Sadat, 2013: 336). 
It is also important to refer the minority opinion of Christine Van den Wyngaert of 
March 2014 concerning the case of Germain Katanga, since it illustrates this 
problematic and it can have repercussions in future trials. The judge disagreed with 
Germain Katanga’s conviction for lack of evidence of his criminal responsibility to 
intentionally contribute to the perpetration of crimes by a group of persons with 
knowledge that this group had such purpose (Article 25, paragraph 3, subparagraph d, 
vii) and the interpretation of the evidence could have been made in a different and 
more convincing manner. As for the accusation of crimes against humanity, the judge 
argued numerous points. Firstly, the number of victims was insufficient to qualify the 
acts as crimes against humanity and, therefore, there was no multiple commission of 
acts; secondly, the intent of targeting the civilian population was not proved in an 
incontestable manner; thirdly, the existence of a policy and of an organization was not 
proved incontestably and, finally, the attack could not be considered systematic20
                                                        
20  ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-Anxl, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 07.03.2014. 
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In this context, the decision of the International Law Commission to add the topic 
"crimes against humanity" to its program in June 2013 - following the recommendation 
of the Working Group on the Long-term Programme of Work based on the proposal 
prepared by a working group member, Sean Murphy – is to be welcomed. As the author 
of the proposal notes: 
 
“For example, the mass murder of civilians perpetrated as part of 
an international armed conflict would fall within the grave breaches 
regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but the same conduct 
arising as part of an internal armed conflict (as well as internal 
action below the threshold of armed conflict) would not (…). A 
global convention on crimes against humanity appears to be a key 
missing piece in the current framework of international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international 
human rights law.”21
 
 
Sean Murphy stressed the importance of the elaboration of an international convention 
on the prevention and punishment of such acts. The author mentioned aspects that 
should be taken into account by the Commission for the purposes of the Convention 
such as defining the offense of "crimes against humanity" as expressed in Article 7. 
As for the articulation between the Convention and the ICC, Sean Murphy claims that 
the Convention would benefit substantially from the language of the Statute and 
related instruments as well as jurisprudence. In turn, the adoption of the Convention 
could address aspects that were not covered by the Statute and it could support the 
ICC's mission22
                                                        
21  U.N. Doc. A/68/10, Sean D. Murphy, Annex B, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-fifth 
session, General Assembly, Official Records, Sixty-eighth session, 2013, §2 and §3, pp. 140-141. 
. In particular because, among other aspects mentioned by the author, 
the Statute regulates relations between States Parties and the Court, but not among 
States Parties themselves and between State Parties and non-States Parties. Part IX, 
headed “International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance” implicitly recognizes that 
inter-state cooperation on crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court may occur outside 
the Rome Statute. The Convention could help to promote inter-state cooperation in 
relation to the investigation, detention, prosecution and punishment of individuals who 
commit such crimes, which would be consistent with the object and purpose of the 
Statute. The Convention would require the enactment of national legislation prohibiting 
and punishing these crimes, which in the author's opinion has not been made by 
several Member States yet, helping to fill a gap and, thus, encouraging all States to 
ratify or accede to the Statute. In the case of States that have adopted legislation in 
this regard, frequently it only authorizes the prosecution of crimes committed by 
nationals of that State or in its territory. The Convention would require the State Party 
to broaden its legislation to cover other individuals who are in their territory - nationals 
of other States who commit an offense in the territory of another State Party to the 
Convention. In the event that a State Party receives a surrender request from the 
Court and at the same time, an extradition request from another State in accordance 
with the Convention, Sean Murphy proposes that the Convention should be designed to 
22  Ibid., §8, §9, pp. 142 and f. 
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ensure that States which are party to the Statute and to the Convention can continue 
to follow the procedure outlined in Article 90 of the Statute on competing requests.23
 
 
4. Multifaceting the ICC 
Certain challenges such as terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, the profusion 
of intrastate conflicts with different nuances and complexities and the phenomenon of 
fragile states, failed or collapsed demonstrate the increasing number of distinct and 
intricate situations in which a state is unwilling or unable to conduct an investigation or 
prosecution or is incapable of protecting its population from international crimes. 
Thus, these challenges justify the indispensability of rethinking the ICC through a 
process of adding new facets and deepening facets foreseen in the Statute. More 
specifically, rethinking the competence of this body to expand its jurisdiction to the 
crime of international terrorism − i.e. large-scale terrorist acts, which "threaten the 
peace, security and well-being of the world", acts of atrocities "that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity" and of concern "to the international community as a whole", 
paraphrasing the preamble, similarly to what occurs with the most serious crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the Court – and rethinking the action of the ICC with a view of 
protecting populations from those crimes which should be implemented in articulation 
with the "responsibility to protect" concept. 
 
4.1. Categorization of terrorism as an “international crime” 
Terrorist acts, methods and practices can take many forms and manifestations and aim 
the destruction of human rights and fundamental freedoms24
The idea of including terrorism as one of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community dates back to the Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court of the International Law Commission of 1994. The Commission's proposal 
contained an article - Article 20 - which contemplated - along with the crimes of 
genocide, aggression, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable to armed 
conflict and crimes against humanity - a specific subparagraph, subparagraph e), 
regarding the “treaty crimes” which included terrorism: "Crimes, established under or 
pursuant to the treaty provisions listed in the Annex, which, having regard to the 
conduct alleged, constitute exceptionally serious crimes of international concern."
. The dissemination of a 
new type of terrorism of transnational nature and the proliferation of terrorist groups in 
different parts of the globe, including the territories of States Parties to the Statute, 
groups that could include nationals of those States, imply to revisit the question of the 
possibility of ICC jurisdiction over this matter. 
25
                                                        
23  Ibid., §10 and §12. See Article 90 of the Rome Statute. 
 
24  U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 20.09.2006, p. 2.  
25  U.N. Doc. A/49/10, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-22 July 1994, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Forty-ninth session, Supplement No.10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, 
vol. II (2), p. 38. The Annex refers, for example, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
of Aircraft of 1970, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, 1971, the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979 and the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, pp. 67 ff. 
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Similarly, the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court created by the UN General Assembly in 1996 – with the purpose of preparing a 
widely accepted consolidated text, serving as a basis for negotiation for the 
establishment of an international criminal court - suggested the inclusion of the crimes 
of terrorism among others (Article 5, subparagraph e))26
 
 as an offense covered by the 
conventions mentioned in the Commission's draft statute (paragraph 2), but it went 
further by specifying these crimes as follows: 
“Undertaking, organizing, sponsoring, ordering, facilitating, 
financing, encouraging or tolerating acts of violence against 
another State directed at persons or property and  of such a 
nature as to create terror, fear or insecurity in the minds of public 
figures,  groups of persons, the general public or populations, for 
whatever considerations and  purposes of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or such other 
nature that may be invoked to justify them” (paragraph 1). 
 
“An offense involving use of firearms, weapons, explosives and 
dangerous substances when used as a means to perpetrate 
indiscriminate violence involving death or serious bodily injury to 
persons or groups of persons or populations or serious damage to 
property” (paragraph 3). 
 
The dissent among States at the Rome Conference prevented the incorporation of the 
crime of terrorism in the Statute, but States in resolution E of Annex I to the 
Conference Final Act recognized that "terrorist acts, by whomever and wherever 
perpetrated and whatever their forms, methods or motives, are serious crimes of 
concern to the international community". At the same time, the States, deeply 
apprehensive about the persistence of this serious threat to international peace and 
security, recommended that a Review Conference pursuant to Article 123 of the 
Statute27 should consider the crimes of terrorism to achieve a consensual definition and 
their inclusion in the list of the most serious crimes28
                                                        
26  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13(Vol. III), Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, Rome 15 June-17 July 1998, United 
Nations, 2002, p. 5 and p. 21. 
. However, this topic was not 
discussed at the Kampala Review Conference of 2010. Undoubtedly, the main difficulty 
lies in the absence of an universal legal and political definition enshrined in a 
27  Article 123, paragraph 1 provides that "seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments 
to this Statute. Such review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in Article 5." 
28  UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I), United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, Rome 15 June-17 July 1998, United 
Nations, 2002, pp. 71 and f. At the Rome Conference, several States supported the court's jurisdiction 
over the crimes of terrorism, ibid., Vol. II (for example, Algeria, §18, p. 73, Kyrgyzstan, §71, p. 77, Costa 
Rica, §74, p. 77, Armenia, §83, p. 78, Albania, "institutionalized State terrorism" §12, p. 82, India, §52, 
p. 86 and f., Tajikistan, §17, p. 92, Russian Federation, "most serious terrorist crimes", §20, p. 115, 
Congo, §49, p. 117, Sri Lanka, §35, p. 123, Turkey, "Terrorism shouldn't have been included among 
crimes against humanity, since it was often the root causes of such crimes", §41, p. 124). 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 5, n.º 2 (november 2014-april 2015), pp. 16-44  
The International Criminal Court and the construction of International Public Order 
Sofia Santos 
 31 
 
comprehensive convention on international terrorism, prescribing that large-scale 
terrorist acts constitute an international crime. 
Several authors stress that acts of international terrorism as the 11 September 2001 
attacks could qualify as crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Statute and be 
tried by the ICC. Mireille Delmas-Marty argues that paragraph 2 of this article which 
establishes the notion of an attack directed against a civilian population as an element 
of crimes against humanity could have been applied to these terrorist acts (2013: 561). 
In this regard, Vincent-Joël Proux adds: “other acts of international terrorism, which do 
not compare in magnitude to the events of September 11th
The arguments put forward in favor of including the crime of terrorism within the 
jurisdiction of the Court relate to the limitations of national judiciary systems and to the 
fact that such acts possess features which are common to the most serious crimes 
under the Statute. 
, yet still constitute an 
affront to the principles of humanity, should be prosecuted under this mechanism” 
(2004: 1085). Lucy Martinez contemplates the possibility of individual acts of 
international terrorism falling under crimes against humanity or war crimes, under the 
condition of the existence of an armed conflict (2002: 50). In turn, Surendra Kumar 
although arguing that crimes with the magnitude of 11 September attacks could be 
considered crimes against humanity, minor terrorist acts may not reach the threshold 
and, therefore, not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Moreover, the author sustains 
that while some terrorist acts, to some extent, can be perceived as a crime of genocide 
– the conviction for such acts will always depend on whether the evidence is sufficient 
to meet the elements of the crime of genocide - or as a war crime - when committed in 
armed conflicts, terrorist acts may not always hold these characteristics (2008: 200-
202). In this sense, Surendra Kumar proposes an amendment to the Statute, “the need 
of the hour is that crimes of terrorism, inducing suicide terrorism should be 
incorporated as a separate category and deserves separate contemplation and 
prosecution” (2008: 202). 
The Netherlands proposed an amendment to the list of such crimes in 2009 and 
explained the problematic as follows: 
 
“We have all committed ourselves to cooperate fully in the fight 
against terrorism, in accordance with our obligations under 
international law, in order to find, deny safe  haven and bring to 
justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, any 
person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to 
participate in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration 
of terrorist acts or provides safe haven. Yet, at the same time, 
there is all too often impunity for acts of terrorism in cases where 
states appear unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute 
such crimes. (…) In the light of the absence of a generally 
acceptable definition of terrorism, the Netherlands proposes to use 
the same approach as has been accepted for the crime of 
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aggression, i.e. the inclusion of the crime of terrorism in the list of 
crimes laid down in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Statute (…)”29
 
. 
According to this proposal, the crime of terrorism would be integrated in a new 
subparagraph (subparagraph e) of Article 5, paragraph 1. Furthermore, this article 
would include a third paragraph that would reproduce ipsis verbis the content of the 
second paragraph concerning the crime of aggression in the Statute: 
 
“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism 
once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 
123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which 
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. 
Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations” (Article 5, paragraph 3). 
 
The proposal also provided for the establishment of an informal working group on the 
crime of terrorism at the Kampala Conference tasked to assess to what extent the 
Statute would require changes as a consequence of the introduction of the crime of 
terrorism within the jurisdiction of the Court as well as other relevant questions linked 
to the extension of its jurisdiction. 
If the attacks of 11 September 2001 relaunched the question on whether large-scale 
terrorist acts could constitute “international crimes” and fall within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC, presently several arguments can be enunciated that support the inclusion of 
terrorism as a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Security Council referred to these attacks as a threat to international peace and 
security (resolution 1368 (2001)). In several resolutions, this organ reaffirmed that 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats 
to international peace and security. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 
referred to this phenomenon in the same terms30
The seriousness of this threat is accentuated by its different and multiple forms and 
manifestations, being also perpetrated by non-state actors, groups resorting to 
different methods and with different motivations. 
.  
It is important to underline that terrorism can not and should not be associated with 
any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group - as mentioned by the Security 
Council in Chapter VII decisions and by the General Assembly in the above-mentioned 
Strategy31
                                                        
29  ICC-ASP/8/43/Add. 1, Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference, Annex IV, 10.11.2009, pp. 12 and 
f. 
 - currently, the actions of several extremist groups, most of them 
considered terrorist groups, in which nationals of States Parties may be participating 
and whose acts may occur in the territories of these states is an argument in this 
sense. 
30  U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 20.09.2006, p. 1. 
31  Ibid., p. 2. 
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It is undoubtedly significant that the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has initiated an 
investigation (January 2013) due to the existence of evidence indicating that war 
crimes had been committed since January 2012. These acts are mainly attributed to 
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Defenders of the Faith 
group (Ansar Dine), the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and 
the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)32, the last three terrorist 
groups are ideologically inspired and linked to al-Qaida33. Likewise, it is significant that 
the Prosecutor conducts a preliminary examination concerning the activities of the 
jihadist group Boko Haram, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaida34, which according to 
the report could have committed crimes against humanity since July 200935
The acts committed by the jihadist group “Islamic State”
. 
Nevertheless, if the Prosecutor decides to prosecute, formulating an accusation, it is for 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and, eventually, the Trial Chamber to corroborate these 
assessments. 
36, a splinter group of al-Qaida, 
against Iraqi security forces and civilians were condemned by the Security Council. This 
organ, and several State Parties, qualified these acts as terrorist attacks/acts37
In this regard, it is important to mention resolution 2170 (2014), in which the Security 
Council: 
. The 
proclamation of a transnational caliphate by this group – comprising northern Syria and 
eastern Iraq, with expansionist tendencies, threatening neighbouring countries 
including Jordan, a State Party to the Statute – could increase the perpetration and the 
magnitude of terrorist acts and diversify the characteristics of such acts. 
 
“Deplores and condemns in the strongest terms the terrorist acts 
of ISIL and its violent extremist ideology, and its continued gross, 
systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations 
of international humanitarian law”. 
 
“Recalls that widespread or systematic attacks directed against 
any civilian populations because of their ethnic or political 
background, religion or belief may constitute a crime against 
humanity, emphasizes the need to ensure that ISIL, ANF [Al Nusra 
Front] and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
                                                        
32  ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali, Article 53 (1) Report, 16.01.2013, pp. 13-28. This 
investigation follows a preliminary examination based on the Mali government's referral dated of 13 July 
2012 in accordance with Article 14 given the impossibility of pursuing or prosecuting those responsible for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes especially in the northern part of the territory. See Referral 
Letter, Republique du Mali, Ministère de la Justice, 13.07.2012. 
33 The Security Council linked the Ansar Dine group on 20 March 2013 and the MUJAO on 5 December 2012 
to al-Qaida. The AQIM had originally been associated with the name Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat on 6 October 2001. 
34 On 22 May 2014, the Security Council placed Boko Haram in the list of entities associated with Al-Qaida. 
35  ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 2013, §206 and §209-
§219.  
36  Since June, the designation replaced the previous self-designation of the group of "Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant", also known by the acronym ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant). 
37  U.N. Doc. SC/11437, Security Council Press Statement on Iraq, 11.06.2014. On 30 May 2013, the 
Security Council included this group and the al-Nusra Front in the list of terrorist organizations linked to 
al-Qaida. 
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associated with Al-Qaida are held accountable for abuses of human 
rights and violations of international humanitarian law (…)”. 
 
It is also relevant that the Security Council alludes to the possibility of certain acts 
constitute crimes against humanity and, at the same time, to the existence of other 
types of international crimes, while reaffirming, however, that the acts of ISIL can not 
and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization.  
However, not all terrorist acts can be covered by the provisions and respective 
elements relating to the most serious crimes of international concern. 
Whilst the qualification as a war crime implies the existence of an armed conflict, the 
crime of genocide - although alluding to the "intent to destroy”, which is also a 
characteristic of terrorist acts - requires that this intent aims to destroy in part or in 
whole a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as stated in Article 6, which might 
not be the purpose of certain terrorist acts or it might not be unequivocally proven. 
With regard to crimes against humanity, the Statute’s definition states that the attack 
must be widespread or systematic and this prevents a large-scale attack that does not 
possess these characteristics from being subsumed under this article. In addition, the 
definition states that an attack against any civilian population means a course of 
conduct pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. But it may be 
difficult to establish a link between the conduct and a policy of a State or an 
organization, since terrorist acts can be perpetrated by isolated individuals. The crime 
of aggression can only be committed by a person in a leadership position of an act of 
aggression; as it requires an act of aggression by a State it would not apply to non-
state entities. 
Besides, the principle nullum crimen sine lege provides that a person shall not be 
criminally responsible for a conduct unless it constitutes, at the moment it takes place, 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court (Article 22), this could mean that the 
perpetrators of terrorist acts, shielded by this principle, would go unpunished. 
The underlying ideas of terrorism are the creation of feelings of terror, fear and 
insecurity in individuals and the perpetration of indiscriminate violence involving the 
use of different types of weapons. Hence, the proposal of the Preparatory Committee 
appears the most appropriate solution, but the definition enshrined in paragraph 1 
should be further broadened to include non-state entities. Terrorist acts such as the use 
of a conventional explosive combined with radioactive material in order to disperse it 
over a wide area, exposing victims to radiation (the so-called "dirty bomb") or the 
intentional release of pathogenic microorganisms could be covered by paragraph 3 of 
the Committee’s proposal. At the same time, in line with the Commission and the 
Committee, the insertion of the reference to treaties on terrorism could circumvent the 
existing gap concerning a comprehensive international convention on terrorism and a 
binding and consensual definition. Also a procedure that would enable the inclusion of 
future conventions, which is justified by the increase in the number of conventions on 
this matter in recent years, should be incorporated. 
Alternatively, although the amendment proposal submitted by the Netherlands did not 
gather sufficient support for its consideration at the Kampala Conference and it was 
withdrawn in June 2013, within the Working Group on Amendments established by the 
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Assembly of States Parties as a mechanism for discussing amendment proposals38
 
, the 
proposal could be an intermediate solution to resolve this impasse, similarly to what 
happened with the crime of aggression.   
4.2. The ICC and the Responsibility to Protect 
The rethinking of ICC’s action with a view of protecting populations from international 
crimes should be implemented in articulation with a "responsibility to protect" of the 
international community. 
Similarly to the ICC, this responsibility focuses on the crimes of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This concept was developed by the 
"International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (ICISS) and 
presented in the report "The Responsibility to Protect" of 2001. Its relevance was 
acknowledged by the UN Member States in the final document of the 2005 World 
Summit, which incorporated its general features: the responsibility to protect resides 
primarily at the State level and encompasses the prevention of such crimes, including 
its incitement through appropriate and necessary means. When appropriate, the 
international community should encourage and assist a State so that it can exercise 
this responsibility; if national authorities are unwilling or are unable to protect its 
population, the international community should take appropriate collective measures to 
protect it from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in a 
timely and decisive manner under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter39
The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has clarified the responsibility to protect 
concept and, as the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, has defended this 
articulation. The Secretary-General affirmed, in the report "Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect" of 2009, that an important measure under the pillar on the 
protection responsibilities of a State - which include the prevention of such crimes and 
their incitement – concerns first of all the accession to the Statute as well as to relevant 
international instruments and the incorporation of international standards in national 
legislation to ensure that the crimes and their incitement are criminalized under 
national law and practice
. 
40. Ban Ki-moon stressed that the threat of referrals to ICC 
may have a preventive effect41
The deepening of the foreseen preventive facet by the Court is essential, making the 
most of its permanent character – unlike the international ad hoc criminal tribunals, 
implementing, thus, a preventive justice system, also through the encouragement and 
provision of assistance to States Parties in order to build capacity to protect their 
populations, when such need exists. 
.  
In other words, "prevention" should be regarded as a dissuasive and as a deterrent 
measure. As Ban Ki-moon underlines: 
 
                                                        
38  ICC-ASP/12/44, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, 24.10.2013, §4. 
39  U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1, World Summit Outcome, 24.10.2005, §138 and §139. 
40  U.N. Doc. A/63/677, Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-General, 
12.01.2009, §17. 
41  U.N. Doc. A/66/874, Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response, Report of the Secretary- 
General, 25.07.2012, §29. 
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“by seeking to end impunity, the International Criminal Court and 
the United Nations-assisted tribunal have added an essential tool 
for implementing the responsibility to protect, one that is already 
reinforcing efforts at dissuasion and deterrence”42
 
. 
In the same vein, Phakiso Mochochoko, Director of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity 
and Cooperation Division of the ICC, affirms: 
 
“Prevention is key to all our efforts. For the Office, this preventive 
role is foreseen in the Rome Statute Preamble and reinforced in 
the Office’s prosecutorial strategies. In fact, the Preamble makes 
clear that prevention is a shared responsibility in writing that State 
Parties are `determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes`. The Office of the Prosecutor will make 
public statements referring to its mandate when violence escalates 
in situations under its jurisdiction; it will visit situation countries to 
remind leaders of the Court’s jurisdiction; it will also use its 
preliminary examinations activities to encourage genuine national 
proceedings and thereby attempt to prevent the recurrence of 
violence. Given that the commission of massive crimes can 
threaten international peace and security, the Security Council can 
complement the OTP’s [Office of the Prosecutor’s] preventive 
efforts”43
 
. 
In this context, the Prosecutor could play a significant role in the preventive efforts 
since he/she may initiate an investigation proprio motu based on information on crimes 
(Article 15). The Office of the Prosecutor, as a separate and independent organ, is 
“responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information (...), for 
examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court” 
(Article 42, paragraph 1). It is important to note, however, that a greater celerity and 
agility on the part of these entities is needed in order to prevent violence, i.e., in the 
pre-violence stage or when it is unfolding, to prevent further occurrence of crimes, 
restraining it within a short period of time. 
The establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board on June 25, 2014 by the Office of 
the Prosecutor represents a major change. This board will meet annually and make 
recommendations to the Prosecutor about the most recent technological developments 
as well as new scientific methods and procedures that can reinforce the Office's 
capabilities in the collection, management and examination of scientific evidence 
                                                        
42  U.N. Doc. A/63/677, Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-General, 
12.01.2009, §18. 
43  ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Phakiso Mochochoko, Address on behalf of the Prosecutor, Open Debate 
of the United Nations Security Council on “Peace and Justice, with a special focus on the role of the 
International Criminal Court”, 17.10.2012. 
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relating to an investigation and prosecution44
A joint study conducted by experts from Oxford University and the Australian 
Government suggests that the Court's preventive dimension should be implemented 
through encouraging the Statute’s ratification, namely among non-signatories, 
strengthening capacities at the national level, raising awareness activities to inform 
populations on crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, developing clear and more 
objective criteria for Security Council referrals and guaranteeing a more consolidated 
alignment between preventive instruments as non-military coercive measures and 
mediation and criminal justice mechanisms
. But the creation of an early warning and 
situation evaluation capability that could materialize in the establishment of a specific 
organ by the Prosecutor or by the Assembly of States Parties, with competence to 
establish subsidiary bodies, would be indispensable. This organ would pay particular 
attention, but not exclusive, to the phenomenon of fragile, failed or collapsed states 
that are unable to meet their international commitments. This organ could assist in the 
detection, bringing to the attention of the Prosecutor and of the Office relevant 
situations and support and assist the Court in the determination whether the State, due 
to a total or substantial collapse of the national judicial system or its unavailability, is 
unable to conduct an investigation or prosecution (Article 17, paragraph 3). 
45
As for the materialization of this interconnection, the Security Council referral
. These measures could be implemented in 
the articulation process of the ICC with the responsibility to protect. 
46
Although the resolution does not explicitly allude to a responsibility to protect by the 
international community, it refers in the Preamble "recalling the Libyan authorities' 
responsibility to protect its population”. This decision imposed an obligation on the 
Libyan authorities to cooperate and provide the necessary support to the Court and the 
Prosecutor. In resolution 1973 (2011), the Council reiterated the authorities’ 
responsibility to protect the Libyan population. In addition, it authorized coercive 
military measures and recalled the decision to refer the situation to the ICC, 
emphasizing that those responsible for or complicit in attacks against the civilian 
population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held accountable. 
 of the 
situation in Libya in 2011 took on a paradigmatic significance for two reasons. Firstly, 
resolution 1970 linked the Court's role to the responsibility to protect and, secondly, 
the resolution was unanimously adopted, despite the reluctance of the United States, 
the Russian Federation and China regarding the ICC’s mission, permanent members of 
the Council, which seems to indicate a change in the perception of the Court. 
Carsten Stahn (2011) affirmed regarding resolution 1970 that: 
 
“This resolution marked the first incident in which the ICC was 
expressly recognized in Council practice as a core element of 
preventing and adjudicating atrocities in line with the ‘R2P’ 
[responsibility to protect] concept (…) With the Security Council 
                                                        
44  ICC, Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Establishes a Scientific 
Advisory Board, 27.06.2014. 
45  Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, Australian Government, Australian Civil-Military 
Centre, The Prevention Toolbox: Systematising Policy Tools for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities, The 
International Criminal Court, Policy Brief Series No.5, September 2013, p. 3. 
46  The importance of the “responsibility to protect” was highlighted for the first time in resolution 1674 
(2006). 
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referral, international justice has become one of the primary 
means of constraining  violence and securing accountability, not 
only in the context of hostilities, but also in  ensuring justice after 
conflict”. 
 
Nevertheless, the author warned that the Libyan case became a test for the 
management of the idea of "shared responsibility", after the detention of Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi by the Libyan authorities (Stahn, 2012), who is still not under the custody of 
the Court, despite several unsuccessful attempts to challenge its jurisdiction. 
The articulation between the ICC and the responsibility to protect, more specifically, the 
role of this jurisdictional organ will inevitably be conditioned by the Security Council, 
i.e., by its decision to refer situations relating to non-states parties under Chapter VII if 
one or more crimes under ICC jurisdiction appear to have been committed, after its 
determination of the existence of a threat to peace under Article 39 of the Charter. The 
lack of a Security Council decision with respect to failed states and the divergences 
among permanent members on the interpretation of “threat to peace” will certainly 
hinder the referral of certain situations to the ICC. 
In fact, the Security Council lacks objective binding criteria to determine a threat to 
peace and is held hostage to political discretion. The establishment of criteria in this 
regard and the introduction of changes concerning the right of veto (Santos, 2012: 
560-561) would avoid situations in which the Council is unable to refer the case to the 
ICC due to the threat or use of the veto, as in the case of Syria. Even recently, in May 
2014, the Russian and Chinese vetoes prevented the adoption of a resolution in this 
regard. 
The process should, therefore, be allied to an uniform application to similar situations 
by permanent members and to previous changes to the veto system to avoid such 
situations. It is important to note that the ICISS in its report "The Responsibility to 
Protect" declared: 
 
“(…) the Commission supports the proposal put to us in an 
exploratory way by a senior representative of one of the 
Permanent Five countries, that there be agreed by the Permanent 
Five a “code of conduct” for the use of the veto with respect to 
actions that are needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian 
crisis. The idea essentially is that a permanent member, in matters 
where its vital national interests were not claimed to be involved, 
would not use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would 
otherwise be a majority resolution. The expression “constructive 
abstention” has been used in this context in the past (…)”47
 
. 
Among the Security Council reform proposals it should be referred the introduction of a 
voluntary conduct limiting the exercise of the veto right in situations of genocide, war 
                                                        
47  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
§6.21, p. 51. 
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crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing or the elimination of this right, 
which appears infeasible, or the need of current and eventual new permanent members 
to justify this action.  
This articulation is justified by the observation of common denominators, at the 
beginning of a timid practice – which should be explored and deepened – and by the 
possibility of contributing to the consolidation and enabling a broader exploration of the 
Court's role and to increased human rights protection. 
This jurisdictional organ could be relevant in the prevention prior to the occurrence of 
violence or when it is unfolding as a reaction mechanism - which could occur alongside 
an intervention with use of force by the international community. The objective is to 
end violence through its intervention by putting those responsible under its custody. 
This action is justified by the fact that a State’s judicial system may be unable to 
function in times of conflict or even in the reconstruction phase, after the international 
intervention with use of force, i.e., in the reconciliation and criminal retribution process. 
Regarding justice and reconciliation, the ICISS warned of the possibility that in many 
situations the state in whose territory a military intervention took place may have 
never had a non-corrupt or properly functioning judicial system48
The effects of the “responsibility to protect” and the mission of the ICC will have a 
greater impact if this concept acquires the status of an international norm (Santos 
2012: 562). Although the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council is 
viewed with scepticism and concern, which is to some extent justifiable due to the 
Security Council’s political nature, a tripartite cooperation in this context may be 
beneficial. 
. 
 
5. Conclusions 
An effective international public order is desirable. The sustainability of an order with 
such features, however, requires a permanent construction process in order to meet 
adequately the increasing and different challenges and to overcome emerging 
vulnerabilities. International criminal law embodied in the ICC will be crucial to achieve 
this aspiration. 
By resorting to “a graphical representation” it can be concluded “that the substantive 
law that the ICC applies is a smaller concentric circle within a larger circle, which 
represents the total international criminal law” (Bacelar Gouveia, 2013: 784) and 
important limitations can be pointed out to the ICC such as the possibility of its activity 
be constrained by the Security Council, tensions deriving from the complementary 
nature of its jurisdiction and interpretive questions raised by certain provisions of the 
Statute, but focusing only on those facts entails the risk of obtaining a reductive 
assessment of the merits and potential of the ICC. 
The Statute’s regulatory project and, specifically, the Court may be more successful 
and influence the construction of an international public order in a more effective 
manner if the process of permanent construction of this body takes into account the 
need to fill gaps and the challenges of the contemporary world. 
                                                        
48  Ibid., §5.13, p. 41. 
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In this sense, there should be clarification of ambiguous aspects by the Court relating 
to the crime of aggression and crimes against humanity, as underestimating these 
aspects could hamper the efficient and expeditious delivery of justice. In the case of 
the crime of aggression the evolutive process cannot be oblivious to the Security 
Council’s determinations. In the case of crimes against humanity, the Court shall 
specify the content of Article 7, a task that would be facilitated by the entry into force 
of a future international convention on the prevention and punishment of such crimes. 
The Court should also explore new facets and deepen those foreseen in the Statute, 
making the most of its independent and permanent character, which allowed its 
detachment from a “victor’s justice” connotation attributed to the international ad hoc 
criminal tribunals. 
The distinct and intricate situations of passivity, inaction or impunity on the part of 
States that require the protection of the human dignity, which result from new 
challenges, imply a greater involvement of the ICC. Thus, a rethinking of its 
jurisdiction, extending its scope to the crime of terrorism, subjecting the perpetrators 
of terrorist acts to international justice is necessary. This inclusion is justified by the 
increasing dissemination of terrorism at the global level and by the fact that its 
different forms and manifestations may not be covered by the provisions and elements 
of crimes prescribed in the Statute. Simultaneously, this article proposes an articulation 
of the ICC’s mission with the "responsibility to protect" of the international community 
which should be expressed in the different dimensions of this responsibility: prevention, 
reaction and rebuilding a lasting peace. 
Although the jurisprudence is still scarce, namely concerning convictions, it cannot be 
ignored that the threshold of the first decade of the 21st century marks a turning point 
in the activity of the ICC. The gradual confluence around the Court by States Parties, 
by non-party States and by the Security Council demonstrates the growing recognition 
of the Court’s relevance by the international community as well as the application of 
the system envisioned in the Statute. 
These reasons and the potential of the ICC allow for the prospect of a passage from the 
present adolescence (Soares, 2014: 10) to adulthood characterized by increasingly 
confident steps, a maturing process leading to a consolidated and more effective 
criminal justice system. 
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